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SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY 
THE STATE OF AMESTONIA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF RIESLAND 
ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING 
THE FROST FILES 
 
The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (hereinafter 
referred to as “Amestonia” and “Riesland” respectively and “the Parties” 
collectively), 
 
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the 
legality of certain alleged acts of espionage, and other matters; 
 
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by 
means of negotiation; and 
 
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court 
of Justice (hereinafter referred to as “the Court”) to resolve this dispute; 
 
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement: 
 
Article 1 
The Parties submit the questions contained in this Special Agreement 
(together with Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to 
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court.  
 
Article 2 
(a) It is agreed by the Parties that Amestonia shall act as Applicant and 
Riesland as Respondent, but such agreement is without prejudice to 
any question of the burden of proof. 
(b) The Parties agree that any reference in this Special Agreement to 
documents obtained and disclosed without the consent of 
Respondent is without prejudice to Respondent’s objection to the 
admissibility of these documents as evidence before the Court.  
Article 3 
(a) The rules and principles of international law applicable to the 
dispute, on the basis of which the Court is requested to decide the 
Case, are those referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute 
of the Court. 
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(b) The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, 
including the rights and obligations of the Parties, arising from its 
Judgment on the questions presented in the Case. 
 
Article 4 
(a) All questions of rules and procedure shall be regulated in accordance 
with the provisions of the Official Rules of the 2016 Philip C. Jessup 
International Law Moot Court Competition. 
(b) The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings 
should consist of Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later 
than the date set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2016 Philip C. 
Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. 
 
Article 5 
(a) The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and 
binding upon them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good 
faith. 
(b) Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall 
enter into negotiations on the modalities for its execution. 
 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized, have 
signed the present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their 
respective seals of office. 
Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this first day of September in 
the year two thousand fifteen, in triplicate in the English language. 
 
Mata Rosenberg,  Klaus Hall, Ambassador of the State of Amestonia 
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Riesland to the Kingdom of The 
Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands 
**SPECIAL AGREEMENT** 
THE CASE CONCERNING THE FROST FILES 
AMESTONIA / RIESLAND 
1. Riesland is a developed democratic state with a population of 
approximately 100 million, which boasts one of the fastest growing 
free-market economies in the world. Many of Riesland’s top 
corporations are listed on the New York, London, and Shanghai 
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stock exchanges. Its rapidly-expanding information technology and 
communications sector is world-renowned.  
2. Amestonia is a developing country bordering Riesland to the south, 
with a population of approximately 20 million. Amestonia is a 
predominantly agrarian export economy. Agriculture employs 55% 
of Amestonia’s workforce.  
3. The Rieslandic Secret Surveillance Bureau (“the Bureau”) engages, 
inter alia, in covert operations and collects intelligence outside of 
Riesland pursuant to the provisions of the Secret Surveillance 
Bureau Act 1967 (“SSBA”), as amended. 
4. Section 21 of the SSBA, entitled “Electronic Surveillance,” grants 
the Director of the Bureau (“the Director”) the power to authorize 
“electronic surveillance,” without a court order, to acquire “foreign 
intelligence.” The SSBA defines “electronic surveillance” as “the 
installation of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device 
outside Riesland’s territory, and/or the acquisition by such a device 
of the content of or other technical information concerning a wire or 
radio communication.” The statute defines “foreign intelligence” as 
“any information located or emanating from outside Riesland’s 
territory, which is relevant to the ability of Riesland to protect itself 
against any actual or potential threat to its national security or the 
ability of Riesland to conduct its foreign affairs.” 
5. Section 32 of the SSBA, “Minimization Procedures and Structural 
Safeguards,” sets forth five limitations on the Bureau’s surveillance 
activity. First, electronic surveillance may not be authorized by the 
Director whenever there is a “substantial likelihood” that 
information acquired thereby will include “any communication to 
which a national of Riesland is a party.” Second, it establishes a five-
judge National Security Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), which must 
review all electronic surveillance conducted under the SSBA every 
six months. Proceedings before the Tribunal are closed to the public, 
but the Tribunal is authorized to call on technical experts, academics, 
and NGOs to participate as amici curiae. Third, a Parliamentary 
Committee for Surveillance Oversight is created, with access to all 
information relating to the Bureau’s operations, and the capacity to 
launch independent investigations and to summon the Bureau’s 
Director and other personnel to appear before it. Fourth, the statute 
provides that surveillance of “foreign public officials” may be 
authorized only when the Director, with the concurrence of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, considers it “necessary.” Fifth, the 
Bureau must comply with any regulations issued by the Attorney 
General concerning legal aspects of any surveillance program.   
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6. Relations between Riesland and Amestonia, which share a common 
language and have similar ethnic composition, have been largely 
positive. On 11 December 1970, Riesland’s Prime Minister visited 
Amestonia to mark the centenary of the completion of the first 
railway line between the two countries. During that visit, the Prime 
Minister and his Amestonian counterpart signed a number of 
bilateral agreements, concerning tourism, trade, extradition, 
intelligence-sharing, and other fields of cooperation. Since then, the 
two nations have enjoyed healthy cross-border economic, cultural 
and security ties, including the establishment of a free-trade area in 
agricultural and agricultural-related goods in 1992. By 1998, 
Riesland had become the top importer of Amestonian agricultural 
produce, totaling approximately €1.5 million per day. Between 2003 
and 2013, Amestonia saw an annual GDP growth rate of between 
6.8% and 7.4%, the highest in the region. 
7. On 4 March 1992, Riesland and Amestonia signed the “Treaty on 
The Establishment of Broadcasting Facilities” (“the Broadcasting 
Treaty,” Annex I), pursuant to which each state was permitted to 
build, staff, and operate a television station in the other’s territory. In 
a joint press release, ministers from both states expressed their hopes 
that the treaty “will become yet another milestone in what is already 
the warmest of friendships between our two societies.” Both Parties 
ratified the Broadcasting Treaty shortly thereafter. 
8. Riesland National Television is a state-owned and operated 
corporation, which provides public broadcasting services across 
Riesland. In accordance with the Broadcasting Treaty, Riesland 
established a new division of the corporation, The Voice of Riesland 
(“VoR”), to operate in Amestonia. The inaugural program of the new 
station and its Amestonian counterpart, a combined performance by 
the two countries’ national orchestras of Vivaldi’s “The Four 
Seasons,” aired on 22 December 1992. VoR broadcast a variety of 
award-winning documentaries and highly-acclaimed programs for 
the next 22 years.  
9. One of VoR’s most popular shows was “Tea Time with Margaret,” 
a weekly one-hour news program featuring interviews with leading 
Amestonian political and business figures. Margaret Mayer, the 
show’s host, is a television icon from Riesland, appointed by the 
Ministry of Telecommunications to serve as Head of VoR. Among 
those appearing on her show were former and incumbent 
Amestonian presidents, cabinet ministers, parliamentary party 
leaders, business executives, and diplomats.  
10. The Institute for Land and Sustainable Agriculture (“ILSA”), a 
Dutch NGO established for the purpose of monitoring global soil 
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structure, composition, and biodiversity, began to express concerns 
in the early 1990s about the long-term sustainability of Amestonia’s 
agricultural production and trade. In particular, ILSA’s reports 
addressed Amestonian farmers’ reliance on a class of neuro-active 
insecticides known as neonicotinoids, or “neonics,” produced solely 
by Rieslandic companies, to boost yields. From time to time ILSA 
called on the governments of both countries to study and review the 
environmental and ecological impacts of these insecticides on the 
regional biosphere.  
11. On 2 October 2012, ILSA published a report entitled “The Plight of 
the Bumblebee.” The report summarized a 20-year peer-reviewed 
scientific study examining the negative effects of the increased use 
of neonics by Amestonian farmers on populations of bees and other 
pollinators. ILSA experts found that the region’s honeybee 
population had decreased by some 25% over the previous 20 years, 
due in part to the well-documented phenomenon of Colony Collapse 
Disorder (“CCD”). The report also found a statistically significant 
correlation – but not definitive evidence of causation – between the 
gradual increase in CCD and the rise in the use of neonics across the 
region. ILSA urged Riesland to reevaluate its production of this type 
of insecticide, and Amestonia to reevaluate its extensive use, 
suggesting that the only long-term solution would be a complete 
phase-out of neonicotinoids. It concluded, “the current rate of 
decrease in bee populations will, if it continues unchecked, result in 
catastrophic consequences for the environment, for food production, 
for sustainable farming, and ultimately for the economies of both 
states.” 
12. The European Commission adopted a Regulation on 24 May 2013, 
restricting for a period of two years the use of a number of neonics 
for seed treatment, soil application, and foliar treatment in crops 
attractive to bees. The ILSA report and the European Commission’s 
action sparked academic and parliamentary debates in both Riesland 
and Amestonia, but no policy changes were undertaken in either 
country.  
13. On 2 July 2013, a new website, www.longlivethehive.com, was 
launched. The website invited environmental activists to register 
online and to utilize its chat rooms to discuss ways to stop the 
continued production and use of neonicotinoids. The website quickly 
gained attention in Amestonia and Riesland, and at its peak was 
visited by approximately 200,000 users a day. Conversations on its 
online forums, which protected users’ anonymity, often focused on 
lobbying activities in support of draft legislation. However some 
members also promoted violent actions, including sabotage and 
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arson. One anonymous post, which was later reposted onto social 
media and received widespread attention in Amestonia, read: “Our 
politicians have failed to respond to peaceful initiatives. We must 
take charge and command attention. The despoliation of the Earth, 
and of its living creatures, is an act of violence, and unless it is 
stopped, it must be responded to effectively and in kind.” 
14. On the night of 2 February 2014, seven Amestonian warehouses 
were simultaneously set on fire. The warehouses stored a significant 
number of barrels of neonicotinoids. In total, five people died from 
smoke inhalation, and many others were injured. Two of the dead 
were Rieslandic nationals. Police found spray-painted images of a 
bee on the asphalt outside the sites. Initial government reports 
estimated the damage from the attacks, including long-term adverse 
health consequences for the local population, at €75 million.  
15. The President of Amestonia, Jonathan Hale, was interviewed by 
Margaret Mayer on the day following the arson attacks. When asked 
about the alleged involvement of environmental activists in the 
attacks, President Hale responded: “We do not yet have all of the 
facts concerning these terrible, orchestrated crimes. The police are 
investigating and will bring the perpetrators to justice. Given the 
critical importance of agriculture to our national economy, acts of 
sabotage like these should be seen as attacks on us all. My 
administration will not tolerate such provocations.” 
16. On 7 March 2014, 263 envelopes containing white powder were sent 
to the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture in both Riesland and 
Amestonia, to prominent Amestonian farmers, and to board 
members of three neonic-producing Rieslandic corporations. The 
image of a bee was stamped on the back of all of the envelopes. 
Examinations determined that the powder was a non-toxic variant of 
a neonicotinoid. An anonymous tweet by user @buzzkiller24601 
posted that evening, which quickly went viral, read: “You’ve been 
warned. The threat is real. It must be addressed. Next time you’ll 
taste your own poison. #banneonics #savethebees.”  
17. President Hale and the Prime Minister of Riesland, Alice Silk, 
discussed the arson and the white powder incident in a telephone 
conversation the following day. Prime Minister Silk offered 
Riesland’s continued cooperation in combatting what she called 
“acts of eco-terrorism,” including coordination and sharing of 
intelligence information, and stressed the importance of continued 
agricultural trade between the two countries. Following the call, the 
Prime Minister announced that she had ordered Riesland’s security 
and intelligence services to direct their operations against “what 
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appears to be a new, growing, and dangerous threat to the well-being 
of both of our countries.”  
18. On 16 October 2014, Tom Sivaneta, the Bureau’s Director, met with 
the Amestonian Minister of Internal Affairs. He informed the 
Minister that the Bureau had succeeded in identifying a ring of 
Amestonian environmental activists who had been plotting to 
contaminate a large shipment of honey, intended for consumption in 
Riesland, with a chemically-altered and toxic neonicotinoid. He 
provided the Minister with the names and locations of the ring 
members. The following day, Riesland declared a Terrorism Alert 
pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2003 (Annex II). The Terrorism Alert 
was reissued in April 2015.  
19. On 21 October 2014, the police broke into a garage located in 
Amestonia’s capital and apprehended three Amestonian college 
students. The students had in their possession significant quantities 
of chemically-altered neonicotinoids and detailed maps of a number 
of honey extraction facilities in Amestonia. They admitted to 
planning an attack (which they insisted would not cause injuries or 
deaths), and to being part of a group of environmentalists, which they 
called “The Hive.” The students refused to provide the authorities 
with the names, locations, or future plans of other members of the 
group. 
20. Frederico Frost, a national of Riesland, is a former Bureau 
intelligence analyst who had been part of the Bureau’s eco-terrorism 
working group, established in early 2014. Frost had full access to 
sensitive information relating to Riesland’s intelligence operations 
in Amestonia. On the morning of 16 December 2014, Frost drove 
from the Bureau’s facilities to Amestonia, where he contacted 
Chester & Walsingham, a law firm that had previously represented 
defendants in a number of high-profile whistle-blower and national 
security cases. Frost handed lawyers from the firm a USB drive 
containing nearly 100,000 documents labeled top secret that he said 
he had directly downloaded from Bureau computers. The firm agreed 
to represent Frost in relation to any disclosure or dissemination of 
the materials. 
21. On 18 December 2014, accompanied by his lawyers, Frost met with 
two reporters from The Ames Post, Amestonia’s most widely-
circulated newspaper. He gave the reporters a copy of the USB drive, 
requesting that the newspaper publish the contents on its website. In 
a written statement, Frost explained that “I have come to realize how 
surveillance programs, like the ones I was engaged in, threaten 
individual liberties and sovereign equality. I am compelled to talk 
about this! If we are going to trade liberty for security, we have to do 
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it with our eyes open. These decisions should be made by the public, 
not by politicians.”  
22. In January and February 2015, thousands of documents marked “top 
secret” were gradually published, unedited and unredacted, on the 
website of The Ames Post, following what the newspaper termed “a 
process of authentication and review performed by our reporters and 
lawyers.” One of the documents, published on 23 January and 
headed “The Verismo Program,” bore a signature of Tom Sivaneta. 
It detailed a May 2013 operation he had authorized, in which a 
waterproof recording pod was installed on the undersea fiber optic 
cable that was the primary backbone for Amestonia’s international 
internet and telephone communications traffic. The device was 
placed on a section of the cable located in Riesland’s exclusive 
economic zone. The pod copied all information that went through the 
cable and transferred it to the Bureau’s servers. According to the 
document, 1.2 million gigabytes of data were collected and stored 
daily pursuant to Verismo. The document also noted that, following 
the white powder incident on 7 March, Bureau employees had been 
instructed to use all of the Bureau’s resources “to track 
environmental activists in Amestonia,” relying on specifically 
tailored search terms, or “selectors.”  
23. On 29 January 2015, The Ames Post published on its website a 
document on the letterhead of the Office of the Attorney General of 
Riesland, James Deloponte. Dated 2 July 2014, it detailed 
regulations issued by the Attorney General regarding the Bureau’s 
surveillance. The document provided that all data collected by the 
Bureau through Verismo or related programs, other than as the result 
of investigation of a specific individual, could be stored for a 
maximum of two years. It also noted that the Tribunal, in accordance 
with the SSBA, had reviewed the Verismo Program every six months 
since its inception with no participation from outside experts. The 
Parliamentary Committee for Surveillance Oversight had also 
reviewed Verismo twice in closed-door hearings, but neither the 
Tribunal nor the Committee had ever challenged its legality. 
According to the document, Amestonian security authorities had 
knowingly accepted, on at least 50 occasions, redacted information 
relating to terrorist activity derived from Verismo. 
24. On 2 February 2015, Riesland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a 
diplomatic note to his counterpart in Amestonia requesting the 
immediate extradition of Frost, in accordance with the 1970 
Extradition Treaty, to stand trial for theft and a number of data 
security offenses. The diplomatic note also requested that Amestonia 
recover the information Frost had downloaded, believed to be held 
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by either Chester & Walsingham or The Ames Post, and return it to 
Riesland for use in the ongoing criminal investigation against Frost. 
It emphasized that “any further publication of these materials will 
have a long-term, damaging impact on cooperation between our two 
nations in our joint campaign against terrorism.” The Amestonian 
Minister indicated that the extradition request would be considered 
in accordance with the Treaty, but noted the Amestonian 
Government’s “surprise at the reported scope and reach of 
Riesland’s surveillance programs.” He called upon the Minister to 
provide more information on the extent of these activities and their 
impact on Amestonian nationals’ private lives. 
25. On 16 February 2015, the banner headline of The Ames Post website 
read: “Margaret the Spy!” Another document leaked by Frost stated 
that since its inception in 1992, the premises of the VoR station had 
been used by the Bureau to promote its surveillance activities on 
Amestonian soil. The document was printed on the letterhead of the 
Office of the Bureau’s Director. According to the document, 
Margaret Mayer was part of an operation called “the Carmen 
Program,” intended to collect intelligence on high-ranking 
Amestonian public figures and private sector leaders. Whenever 
such individuals came to be interviewed for Mayer’s show, they 
were told that their electronic devices could interfere with the 
sensitive wireless microphones used during broadcasts. They were 
offered the opportunity to place their devices in a locker within their 
line of sight from the studio. Electronics placed in the locker were 
removed during the interviews by means of a concealed backdoor. 
This provided Bureau engineers, who doubled as VoR employees, 
sufficient opportunity to hack into the guests’ phones and portable 
computers and install a rootkit malware referred to in Frost’s 
documents as “Blaster,” which then provided the Bureau full remote 
privileged access to these devices. The information collected from 
“Carmen” was stored and later analyzed in an underground floor 
within the VoR building, code-named “The Opera House.”  
26. A number of memoranda mentioning “Carmen” were also published 
in raw form on The Ames Post’s site. They revealed that over 100 
Amestonian public figures, businessmen, officials, and diplomats 
were surveilled under this program, whose primary objective was “to 
collect information concerning Amestonia’s domestic and foreign 
policy, in order to advance Riesland’s political and economic 
interests in the region.” One memorandum contained an image of 
David Cornwell, Amestonia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, 
and detailed how Carmen operatives had been able to hack his phone 
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and access emails regarding Amestonia’s positions on upcoming 
votes in the General Assembly and specialized agencies. 
27. That evening, Amestonian police applied to a judge for an 
emergency warrant to seize all assets and property of VoR pending 
an investigation into whether criminal offenses had been committed, 
citing as probable cause the Carmen Program documents published 
by The Ames Post. While the police were in chambers with the judge 
applying for the warrant, VoR’s television broadcasting was 
interrupted and replaced with old reruns of “Tea Time with 
Margaret.” The judge immediately granted the warrant. Upon 
execution of the warrant that night, the Amestonian police found the 
station unattended, although the TV broadcasting equipment and 
various other devices and documents had been left untouched. These 
articles were all catalogued and removed by the police. 
28. At 3:15 A.M. the following morning, Amestonia’s Border Patrol, 
conducting routine operations, encountered Margaret Mayer and two 
other Rieslandic VoR employees on a train crossing into Riesland. 
The Border Patrol requested that they present their travel documents 
for inspection. They refused, and were promptly detained. When the 
commander of the police unit conducting the investigation into VoR 
learned of this development, she sought and was granted a warrant 
for the arrest of the three on suspicion of espionage. They were 
subsequently charged with that offense, and were denied bail on the 
basis that they were a flight risk. 
29. President Hale held a press conference on the morning of 17 
February 2015. Before taking questions, he read a prepared 
statement:  
I am deeply troubled by reports that Riesland has, for 
decades, engaged in a concerted surveillance campaign 
targeting our citizens and violating our territorial 
integrity and political independence. Riesland’s own 
documents show that these offenses against our 
sovereignty were purely politically motivated and had 
no public order implications. We are entitled to an 
explanation. Any claims that such programs are 
necessary to combat terrorism simply ring hollow. No 
matter how severe any perceived threat to Riesland’s 
national security, there is absolutely no justification for 
the systematic infringement of our citizens’ privacy. 
Mass electronic surveillance of our people and 
institutions violates Riesland’s obligations under the 
U.N. Charter, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic 
and Consular Relations, the Broadcasting Treaty, and 
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principles of comity between nations. Simply put, 
gentlemen do not read each other’s mail, and friends do 
not spy on friends. 
30. In response to a reporter’s question, President Hale went on to say, 
“Our police authorities are treating the VoR facilities and its 
equipment as a crime scene. Margaret Mayer and the other VoR 
employees are suspected of having committed the very serious crime 
of espionage, charges which will be handled according to our laws.” 
He denied that the search of the premises and the detention of the 
three individuals violated Amestonia’s obligations under the 
Broadcasting Treaty, saying: “the VoR facilities and employees lost 
their immunities and privileges once the station ceased acting as a 
broadcaster and became a nest of spies.” Amestonia then recalled its 
ambassador to Riesland for consultations, and officially closed its 
TV station in Riesland. 
31. On 19 February 2015, Prime Minister Silk rejected President Hale’s 
characterization of Riesland’s and VoR’s activities in a televised 
interview. She explained that Riesland’s surveillance programs 
complied with both domestic and international law because they 
“were prescribed by statutes, structured around minimization 
procedures, and routinely reviewed by competent authorities with 
oversight power.” She asserted that the methods employed were 
“both necessary and proportionate,” observing that the results of the 
surveillance “had benefited the national security and interests of 
Amestonia just as much as those of Riesland.” She ended her 
statement by saying:  
Our two nations have enjoyed decades of fruitful 
bilateral cooperation, which is now being severely 
compromised. We make no apology for our efforts to 
keep ourselves and our friends safe from acts of 
terrorism. Meanwhile, the Amestonian administration is 
hardly reciprocating our acts of friendship. It is 
providing sanctuary to Frederico Frost, who is accused 
of very serious crimes in Riesland, and has expropriated 
our property and arrested our nationals in blatant 
disregard of the treaty between us. 
32. Joseph Kafker is a 70-year-old retired Amestonian politician who 
founded the Green Party, now the third largest in the Amestonian 
Parliament. For years, Kafker has been a vocal opponent of the use 
of neonics in agricultural production. During his years as a Member 
of Parliament he attempted, on a number of occasions, to promote 
legislation banning them. None of these efforts was successful, a fact 
he lamented on his retirement in 2012. On 7 March 2015, Kafker was 
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invited to give the keynote address at an international environmental 
law conference at Riesland’s largest law school. After he completed 
his speech, he was detained by the police, allegedly in accordance 
with the Terrorism Act. The story broke in the international media 
the following day. In a special session, the Amestonian Parliament 
adopted a resolution denouncing Kafker’s detention and demanding 
his release. The Government of Riesland did not respond. 
33. On 10 March 2015, Kafker’s case was brought before the National 
Security Tribunal. Following a request from the Attorney General’s 
Office, the Tribunal ruled that all evidence pertaining to Kafker’s 
activities and leading to his apprehension was “closed material,” as 
the term is defined in the Terrorism Act. The Tribunal further 
allowed Bureau officers to testify via video conferencing, with their 
faces and voices obscured, regarding the need to detain Kafker. 
Following their testimony, the Tribunal granted the petition to extend 
Kafker’s detention for reasons of national security. Kafker’s lawyer, 
who had been selected from a list of approved “special advocates,” 
was present during the proceedings, but was not permitted either to 
consult with his client or to share with him any of the secret 
information said to substantiate the allegations against him. Kafker 
remains detained without charge in a maximum-security facility in 
Riesland and his detention has been extended by the Tribunal every 
21 days. A motion challenging the constitutionality of the 
proceedings was filed before the Supreme Court of Riesland but was 
denied. 
34. On 12 March 2015, Amestonia’s Foreign Minister contacted his 
counterpart in Riesland and demanded access to the secret evidence 
that constituted the basis for Kafker’s detention. He also stated that, 
in Amestonia’s view, the Terrorism Act did not comply with 
international human rights standards. The Rieslandic Minister 
rejected the request, responding that disclosure of the information 
concerning Kafker’s apprehension would endanger the integrity of 
particular intelligence sources and therefore the national security of 
Riesland. The Minister further stressed that the National Security 
Tribunal had already determined that the information could not be 
disclosed in accordance with the Terrorism Act. 
35. On 14 March 2015, President Hale instructed his Minister of Justice 
to refuse the extradition request for Frederico Frost, citing the 
“political offense” exception in the Extradition Treaty. He also 
ordered that Riesland’s request for the documents held by The Ames 
Post be denied. Attorney General Deloponte responded to these 
developments in a statement:  
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The Government of Riesland has repeatedly made clear 
that it will not tolerate the publication of leaked 
confidential information, and that it will do whatever is 
in its power to disrupt any further threats to our national 
security. With or without foreign government support, 
we will continue our efforts to bring the fugitive Frost to 
justice, and to stop the damage that will result from any 
dissemination of Riesland’s top secret documents. 
36. On 17 March 2015, The Ames Post website’s banner read “A Kafker-
esque Affair.” A memorandum, sourced from Frost’s USB stick, 
revealed that a May 2014 interview with Kafker on “Tea Time with 
Margaret” had allowed the Bureau to hack into his electronic 
devices. According to the memorandum, Kafker was considered a 
“high-level suspect with ties to The Hive, including the planned 
contamination of a large shipment of honey with a toxic variant of 
neonicotinoids in 2014.” The continuous surveillance of Kafker, 
following the bugging of his devices, was considered a “top 
priority.” From intercepted communications, Bureau analysts were 
able to establish that Kafker was a frequent visitor to the 
longlivethehive website, had participated in online chats, and had 
used the forum’s “like” function to endorse conversations including 
calls for violent disruptions to raise public awareness of the neonics 
controversy. Attorney General Deloponte refused to comment on 
questions raised by the media following The Ames Post’s 
publication. He stated only that Riesland was in possession of 
“closed materials” that “directly link Kafker to The Hive’s senior 
echelons.” 
37. On 22 March 2015, the computer networks and communication 
switches at both The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham were 
hacked and disabled. Investigators found that the hackers had used a 
malicious program to disrupt the operation of the computer systems 
and to corrupt master boot records, to the extent that nearly 90% of 
the information was “non-recoverable.” 
38. Based on traffic analysis, cyber security experts from the 
Amestonian Institute of Technology concluded: “The malware used 
in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses 
within Riesland’s territory that are associated with Riesland’s 
computer infrastructures. Significant segments of code in the 
malware are exact replicas of those used in the Bureau’s ‘Blaster’ 
program. These code segments are not otherwise known to be in use 
or available to the general public.” Both Chester & Walsingham and 
The Ames Post contracted external appraisers, who have estimated 
the combined damages related to infrastructure and to unrecoverable 
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data at €45-50 million. A significant number of proceedings before 
Amestonian courts were delayed for months as a result of Chester & 
Walsingham’s inability to access its files. The Ames Post had to shut 
down its operations entirely; it resumed publication only in June 
2015. 
39. On 1 April 2015, President Hale issued a statement denouncing the 
cyberattacks, stating that “all of the evidence points back to the 
Bureau and to Riesland.” He described them as “not only 
undermining freedom of expression and attorney-client privilege – 
essential values in and of themselves,” but as an “assault upon the 
very principles that stand at the core of our society.” In an interview 
with local news held on 5 April 2015, Attorney General Deloponte 
refused to respond to allegations that Riesland was involved in the 
attacks. 
40. On 22 April 2015, the Amestonian Ministry of Justice announced 
that the police investigation into the items found at the VoR station 
premises had determined that a number of them had been used for 
surveillance. The Ministry reported that it had obtained a forfeiture 
order against the premises and all property found there on the basis 
that it was employed in criminal activity. Finally, the Ministry stated 
its intention to sell the station’s real estate and property, estimated to 
be worth €20 million, by public auction. Challenges to the original 
warrant dated 16 February 2015 and to the forfeiture order, presented 
to Amestonia’s High Court by attorneys from Riesland National 
Television Corporation, were rejected. All subsequent appeals were 
summarily dismissed. The auction has been stayed until the 
conclusion of all outstanding legal proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice. 
41. In mid-2015, diplomats from Riesland and Amestonia began 
meeting in an attempt to settle their differences. After several months 
of negotiations, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. In 
July 2015, Amestonia circulated among the members of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council the text of a proposed resolution 
calling on the recently-appointed Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Privacy to investigate whether Riesland’s cyber and surveillance 
programs were in compliance with international law. An article 
published in The Sydney Morning Herald on 9 July 2015 reported 
that Riesland’s supporters on the Council had urged it to resolve its 
disputes with Amestonia. A source within the Council told the 
newspaper: “A number of countries voiced their concern that the 
continued uncertainty as to the legality of the challenged surveillance 
programs would hinder their ability to continue to engage and share 
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intelligence with Riesland without fear of being complicit in human 
rights abuses.” 
42. In light of growing international pressure, Riesland and Amestonia 
agreed to refer all matters in dispute to the International Court of 
Justice, and for this purpose have drafted and signed this Special 
Agreement. Riesland, however, has reserved its objections to the 
admissibility of information derived from any confidential 
documents that may have been provided to The Ames Post by Frost. 
The parties agreed that the issue of the admissibility of the 
documents would be left for the Court to resolve, as reflected in 
Article 2(b) of this Special Agreement. 
43. Amestonia and Riesland are both members of the United Nations, 
and are parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice; the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations; the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations; the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings; and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Neither state has made 
any reservations, declarations or understandings with regard to any 
of these treaties. 
44. Applicant asks the Court to adjudge and declare that: 
(1) The documents published on the website of The Ames 
Post are admissible as evidence before the Court; 
Riesland’s mass electronic surveillance programs 
against Amestonian public figures and nationals 
revealed in those documents violates international 
law; and Amestonia is therefore entitled to an order 
directing the immediate cessation of those programs 
with assurances of non-repetition;  
(2) The seizure and forfeiture of the VoR station and its 
equipment, and the arrest of Margaret Mayer and the 
other two VoR employees, did not violate the 
Broadcasting Treaty, and were in accordance with 
Amestonia’s other international law obligations; 
(3) The detention of Joseph Kafker under the Terrorism 
Act violated international law, and Amestonia is 
therefore entitled to his immediate release, the 
disclosure of all information which formed the basis 
of his apprehension, and the payment of compensation 
for his detention; and 
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(4) The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The 
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable 
to Riesland, and constitute an internationally wrongful 
act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation.  
45. Respondent asks the Court to adjudge and declare that: 
(1) The illicitly-obtained documents published on the 
website of The Ames Post are inadmissible before the 
Court, but in the event that the Court does find them 
to be admissible, they do not evidence any breach by 
Riesland of an international obligation owed to 
Amestonia; 
(2) The arrest of Margaret Mayer and the other VoR 
employees, and the expropriation of the VoR facility 
and its equipment, violated the Broadcasting Treaty 
and international law generally, and Riesland is 
therefore entitled to the immediate release of its 
nationals and compensation for the value of the 
confiscated property;  
(3) Riesland’s detention of Joseph Kafker under the 
Terrorism Act is consistent with its obligations under 
international law, and the Court has no authority to 
order either Kafker’s release or the disclosure of the 
information relating to his apprehension; and 
 (4) The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The 
Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham cannot be 
attributed to Riesland, and in any event did not 









TREATY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF BROADCASTING FACILITIES 
BETWEEN THE STATE OF AMESTONIA 
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF RIESLAND 




The State of Amestonia and the Federal Republic of Riesland (“the 
Contracting Parties”),  
(a) desiring to fortify the friendship between the two countries; (b) 
recognizing the importance of strengthening understanding and cooperation 
between their peoples; (c) seeking to offer their citizens radio and television 
channels that will reflect the two nations’ dynamic political, cultural, and 
artistic activity; have agreed upon the following articles: 
 
ARTICLE 1 
1. Each Contracting Party may establish and operate in the territory of the 
other a radio and television broadcasting station. 
2. The land on which each station will be constructed will be procured by 
the operating-state and held in its name. The operating state will be 
responsible for staffing, running, and funding the station, and shall 
procure at its own expense and in its own name the materials and other 





Each station shall produce and air programs and content including news 
stories, interviews, documentaries, and movies produced either in or by the 






1. The premises referenced in article 1(2) of the present Treaty shall be 
inviolable, and agents of the host state may not enter those premises 
without the consent of the head of the station. Such consent may be 
assumed only in cases of fire or other similar disaster posing or 
threatening serious immediate danger to public safety or order. 
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2. In addition to the premises of the station, its furnishings, equipment, and 
other property used in its operation, as well as its means of transport, 
shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, expropriation, or 
execution. 
3. The receiving state is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to 
protect the premises of the station against any intrusion or damage, and 
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the premises or impairment of 
its dignity. 
 
4. The archives and documents of the station shall bear visible external 
marks of identification, and shall be inviolable at all times and wherever 





1. Each station's employees, who are also nationals of the operating state, 
shall be entitled to the  
following immunities and privileges: 
a) The persons of each station’s employees shall be inviolable, and 
they shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The 
host state shall treat them with due respect and shall take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their freedom or 
dignity. 
b) Each station’s personnel shall enjoy immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving state, and shall not be obliged to give 
evidence as witnesses.   
c) In respect of acts performed by an employee of the station in the 
exercise of its functions, the immunities and privileges shall 
continue to subsist after the employee’s functions at the station 





1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of 
all persons employed by each station to respect the laws and 
regulations of the host state. Those who are nationals of the operating 
state have an additional duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
the host state. 
2. The premises of the station must not be used in any manner 
incompatible with the station’s functions as envisaged in the present 
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Treaty, in other rules of general international law, or in any other 





All privileges and immunities provided for in this Treaty, save for those in 
Article 15(1)(c) above, shall cease to have effect upon the cessation of the 





The term of this agreement shall be 30 years.  
 
 
(Signed)     (Signed) 
Shannon Belle Cambridge   John Andre Sorge 
Minister of Telecommunications Minister of State of 
State of Amestonia Telecommunications 
 Federal Republic of 
Riesland 












“National Security Tribunal” (“the Tribunal”) shall have the meaning given 
that term under the Secret Surveillance Bureau Act 1967;  
[...] 
“Terrorist Act” shall mean an act as defined in Article 2.1(b) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(9 December 1999);  
[...] 
 
2. Terrorism Alert 
If the Government receives information that there is a credible danger of an 
imminent terrorist act being committed in Riesland, it may issue a Terrorism 
Alert. Such an Alert shall be valid for six months, unless it is revoked earlier. 
Upon its expiration or revocation, the Government may issue a new 
Terrorism Alert if it considers that the credible danger of terrorist acts still 
persists or has been revived. 
 
3. Detention Powers 
a.  When a Terrorism Alert is in force, the Government may detain any 
foreign national suspected of being involved in instigating, authorizing, 
planning, financing, carrying out, or aiding a Terrorist Act, as defined 
herein, for a period not exceeding 180 days.  
b. Except as provided herein, no court shall review the detention of any 
person hereunder, but every detainee shall be brought before the Tribunal 
within three days of his or her detention.  
c. Proceedings before the Tribunal will be held in secret, and its 
proceedings will not be disclosed to the public or the media. Records of 
the Tribunal’s proceedings shall be entitled to the highest protection 
provided by law.  
d. The Tribunal may decide whether continued detention of an individual 
is required for reasons of national security or public safety. The Tribunal 
shall give appropriate consideration to factors including, but not limited 
to: 
i. the likelihood that the detainee has in fact committed, instigated, 
authorized, planned, financed, or aided a Terrorist Act; 
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ii. the likelihood that the detainee will commit a Terrorist Act or will 
incite others to do so if he or she is released; 
iii. the likelihood of family or government rehabilitation or support 
for the detainee if he or she is released; 
iv. the likelihood that the detainee may be subject to criminal trial, 
whether under this Act or some other statute;  
v. the likelihood that, following release, the detainee’s country of 
nationality will request extradition from Riesland; and 
vi. any substantial interest in the detainee expressly stated by 
national law enforcement or intelligence authorities. 
e. In making its decision under subsection (d), the Tribunal may receive 
and accept any documentary or testimonial evidence from any source. It 
shall determine whether or not particular evidence is to be treated as 
“closed material.” Closed material shall not be made available to the 
detainee, his or her counsel, or third parties, without the Tribunal’s 
authorization.  
f. In proceedings before the Tribunal, officials from the security and 
intelligence authorities may be allowed to testify anonymously via video 
conferencing with their faces and voices obscured.  
g. After the initial review provided in subsection (b), each detainee will be 
brought before the Tribunal no less often than every 21 days for a 
periodic review. The Tribunal will consider whether conditions such as 
those listed under subsection (d) have changed, allowing for the 
detainee’s criminal prosecution or release.   
h. The Tribunal may extend the detention of any detainee in appropriate 
circumstances, but no detainee shall remain in custody under this Act for 
a period of more than 540 days in total. 
i. Persons detained under this Act may be represented by legal counsel to 
be selected by them from a list of “Special Advocates,” who possess 
appropriate security clearance. This list shall be compiled by the 
Attorney General. Only Special Advocates will be entitled to participate 
in proceedings where closed material is presented. A Special Advocate 
may not disclose closed materials to or discuss them with the detainee or 
any third party, or obtain the detainee’s instructions pertaining to such 
materials. 
 
[...] 
 
